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Total-Sales Royalties Under the Patent-Misuse Doctrine: A
Critique of Zenith
Acting on the specific authority of the United States Constitution,
Congress grants to inventors, for a limited time, an exclusive right to
their inventions. 1 This patent grant carries out a public policy "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 2 The courts will
prohibit a patentee from extending its limited monopoly in ways
which undermine this patent policy. 3 Under the patent-misuse doctrine, for example, the courts deny infringement relief to a patentee
who has abused the patent privilege.4
This Note considers whether one kind of patent-licensing provision-a total-sales royalty-should constitute patent misuse. 5 A
total-sales royalty provision calls for royalties based upon the licensee's total sales of a product. Unlike licensing provisions based
solely on patent use, a total-sales royalty obligates the licensee to pay
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The present patent law is codified in Title 35 of the
U.S. Code and states in part: "Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, his heirs
or assigns, for the term of seventeen years . . . of the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention throughout the United States . . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
2. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
3. See, e.g., B.B. Chern. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of
America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
4. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
5. The methods of charging for the privilege of using a patent are highly varied. Many of
these licensing provisions have been successfully challenged as constituting patent misuse,
These include (I) "tie-in" arrangements whereby the sale ofunpatented materials is "tied" to
the sale or license of the patented invention, see, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314
U.S. 488 (1942), discussed in text at notes 21-25 infra; (2) requirements that the licensee abstain
from producing products which compete with the licensed product, see, e.g., National
Lockwasher v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943), discussed in note 26 i,!fra;
(3) price-fixing agreements, see, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948);
see Note, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 782 (1961); see also Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent Licenses
and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REV. 273 (1965); (4) discriminatory royalty rates, see, e.g.,
Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alas. 1965), discussed in Note, The Misuse
.Doctrine and Post Expiration-.Discriminatory--and Exorbitant Patent Royalties, 43 IND, L.J.
106, 116-26 (1967); (5) exorbitant royalty rates, see, e.g., American Photocopy Equip. Co, v.
Rovico, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill. 1966), ajfd., 384 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1967); see Note,
Regulation of Patent License Royalty Rates Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1631
(1967); (6) mandatory package licenses, see, e.g., American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass
Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959), discussed in note 69 infra; and
(7) post-expiration royalties, see, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see Comment,
Validity of Patent License Provisions Requiring Payment of Post Expiration Royalties, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1256 (1965); 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 325.
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royalties on the sale of each end product6 covered by the royalty
even though the end product does not embody or use the licensed
patent.7 The United States Supreme Court held in Zenith Radio
Cop. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. ,8 that, " ... conditioning the grant
6. In this Note, "end product" refers to the actual product unit sold by the licensee. "Product" includes the class of end products covered by the royalty. Thus, if the licensee manufactures contact lenses and agrees to pay royalties on the sale of each lens, the contact lenses are
the product covered by the total-sales royalty. The total-sales royalty means that the licensee
must pay royalties on the sale of each lens (the end product), even if the individual lens does
not use the licensed patent. (If there are different classes of end products, such as "hard" and
"soft" lenses, these will be referred to as market segments. See text at note 131 i,ifra.)
In a recent survey, 64% of the respondents reported that royalties are "always" or "usually"
based on a percentage of the licensee's sales. Fifteen percent of the respondents "always" or
"usually" used a fixed sum per unit of sale or production. While the survey investigated the
use of royalties payable upon the sale of end products, it did not distinguish between totalsales royalties and royalties payable only on the sale of end products which use the licensed
patent. See Oppenheim & Scott, Empirical Study of Limitations in Domestic Patent and KnowHow Licensing:.A Preliminary Report, 14 IDEA 193 (1970); Oppenheim & Scott, Empirical
Study of Limitations in Domestic Pale/JI and Know-How Licensing: A Second Report, 14 IDEA
123 (Conference Issue 1970).
7. A further feature of total-sales royalties is that total royalties increase as each end product is sold. Total-sales royalties, moreover, may be divided into two types. Under a "percentage" total-sales royalty provision, the licensee must pay a percentage of its total dollar sales of
the covered product, while under the "flat-rate" total-sales royalty, the licensee must pay a
fixed sum on each sale of the covered product. These differences can be expressed algebraically. Assume

s=
Rp =
Q=

Rf=

sales price per unit of product sold
total quantity produced and sold in units
percentage rate applied to dollar sales
flat rate in dollars applied to each unit sold
Total dollar sales= S • Q.

Thus, under a "percentage" total-sales royalty, the total royalty payment will equal
Rp • (S • Q), while the royalty per unit will equal Rp • ~ • Q or Rp • S. This means that total
royalties will increase with each unit sold by the amount of Rp • S. Moreover, the royalty per
unit will vary with tile sales price per unit product.
In contrast, under a "flat-rate" total-sales royalty provision, total royalties will amount to
Rf • Q. Although total royalties will increase with each unit sold, total royalties will not vary
with the sales price.
An example of the "percentage" total-sales royalty provision may be found in Mutchnik v.
M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610, 611-12, 337 A.2d 72, 73 (1975), discussed in text at notes 90-94
i,yra. The license agreement specified that Willett would:
(b) . . . pay Licensors (the Mutchniks) . . . a royalty of five percent (5%) of the highest
gross invoiced prices charged by Licensee (Willett) and/or its sublicensees for such [metal
table] slides . . . . In the event Licensee and/or any of its sublicensees shall manefacture
and/or sell any other slides, such royalty shall also apply ,to and be payable on the same
basis, on the manz!facture and/or sale ofsuch other slides.
.
274 Md. at 611-12, 337 A.2d at 73 (emphasis original).
An example of the "flat-rate" total-sales royalty provision may be found in Glen Mfg. Inc.
v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970),
discussed in text at notes 95-99 i,ifra. The license agreement provided that
(4) Perfect Fit and C. & H. agree to pay to Glen a royalty often (10) cents on each toilet
tank cover made or sold by Perfect Fit or C. & H. after the date of this agreement, for
the full term hereof, provided, however, that only one payment of royalty will be made by
Perfect Fit or C. & H. on any single toilet tank cover sold under this agreement.
8. 395 U.S. 100 (1969); see text at notes 43-84 infra.
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of a patent license upon payment of royalties on products which do
not use the teaching of the patent does amount to patent misuse." 9
Under this "conditioning" test, a total-sales royalty provision constitutes patent misuse when "the patentee refuses to license on any
other basis and leaves the licensee with the choice between a license
so providing and no license at all." 10 The Court further characterized conditioning as the patentee's use of the patent power "to insist
on a total-sales royalty and to override the protestations of the licensee."11 Thus, the Zenith conditioning test permits total-sales royalties where the provision is implemented for the convenience of the
parties 12 or where the licensee fails to protest such a royalty. 13
This Note criticizes the Supreme Court's treatment of total-sales
royalties. Part I outlines the scope of the patent-misuse doctrine, and
Part II describes the development of the Zenith conditioning test.
Part III analyzes that test; it suggests that the Zenith opinion is not
internally consistent and that courts may not be able to apply the
conditioning test satisfactorily. Finally, in response to Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Zenith, in which he notes the dearth
of literature on the economic consequences of total-sales royalty provisions,14 Part III undertakes an analysis of those consequences. The
analysis demonstrates that total-sales royalty provisions undermine
the purposes of the patent-misuse doctrine by discouraging inventive
activity and by deterring the licensee from entering new markets. In
short, it will be suggested that all total-sales royalty provisions, regardless of conditioning, should be condemned as patent misuse.
I.

HISTORY OF THE PATENT-MISUSE DOCTRINE

The judicially created patent-misuse doctrine arose out of the attempts of patentees to enlarge the scope of their patent monopolies
by "tying" the sale of unpatented materials to the sale or license of
their patented inventions. 15 Although it had previously approved tying, 16 the Supreme Court overruled its approval in Motion Picture
9. 395 U.S. at 135.
10. 395 U.S. at 135.
11. 395 U.S. at 138.
12. 395 U.S. at 138.
13. 395 U.S. at 139.
14. 395 U.S. at 145.
15. For a general discussion of the history of the patent-misuse doctrine, see Nicoson, Mis•
use of the Misuse IJoctrine in Iefringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 76 (1962). See generally
cases cited in note 3 supra.
16. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. I (1912); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener
Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).

June 1978]

Total-Sa/es Royalties

1147

Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manefacturing Co. 17 In that case, the
assignee of a patent had licensed the patented machine on the condition that the licensee notify purchasers that they must purchase unpatented supplies from the licensor. 18 The Court rejected the
assignee's claim that the licensee had infringed the patent by violating this condition. The Court reasoned that the rights of a patentee
are restricted to those expressly granted by the patent 19 and a provision which restricted the buying or selling of unpatented goods extended the patent monopoly to products beyond the scope of the
patent and thereby undermined the policy of a limited patent
grant.20
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 21 the Court further extended the patent-misuse doctrine by allowing it as a defense against
a claim of direct infringement. Unlike the plaintiff in Motion
Picture, who alleged that the licensee had violated the tie-:-in condition,22 the patentee in Morton Salt alleged that the defendant, by
leasing machines within the plaintiff's patent, was liable for patent
infringement.23 The Court rejected this claim on the ground that the
patentee had misused its patent by licensing it on the condition that
the licensee purchase unpatented supplies for the patented product. 24
17. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
18. The plaintiff was the assignee of a patent on a mechanism which accurately and uniformly fed film through a motion picture projector. The plaintiff required its licensee, a manufacturer of projectors, to attach to all its projectors a notice that restricted the use of the
projectors to films specified by the plaintiff.
19. In overruling Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka -Specialty Co., 77 F.
288 (6th Cir. 1896), the Court rejected the argument that since the patentee may withhold the
patent from public use, the patentee must logically and necessarily be permitted to impose any
conditions on the patent's use. 243 U.S. at 514. The Court held that the patentee could not
restrict the buyer's use of the patented machine and asserted that that holding did not deprive
"the inventor [of] the exclusive use of just what his inventive genius has discovered." 243 U.S.
at 513.
20. Although the Court acknowledged that one purpose of the patent laws is to reward
inventors by giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, the Court
also noted that the primary purpose of the patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes,
but is rather "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." 243 U.S. at 5 I I. Accordingly, the Court held that the patent grant is designed to provide only a reasonable reward to
inventors and that "the only effect of[a] patent is to restrain others from manufacturing, using,
or selling" that which has been invented. 243 U.S. at 510.
21. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
22. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). As it did in Motion Picture, the Court has frequently said that the
violation of an illegal tie-in condition by a licensee does not create an infringement cause of
action. See, e.g., Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of
America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
23. The patentee sought damages for infringement as well as an injunction preventing the
licensee from leasing the infringing machines. 314 U.S. at 489.
24. Specifically, the patentee had licensed a patented salt-tablet canning machine on the
condition that the licensee purchase the salt tablets from the patentee's wholly owned subsidiary.
The Court denied relief even though the defendant had not made a licensing agreement
with the patentee nor agreed to the tie-in provision. The Court reasoned, "It is the adverse
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The tie-in provision, the Court said, was an attempt by the patentee
to extend its monopoly beyond what the patent policy permitted.25
Although both Motion Picture and Morton Salt explicitly relied
on the patent policy, the patent-misuse doctrine also rests on antitrust concepts.26 Language in the Morton Saft opinion, for example,
indicated that the Court feared that the patentee's tie-in arrangement
restrained competition in the sale of the unpatented article. 27 The
Court cautioned, however, that it was unnecessary to decide whether
the plaintiff had violated the antitrust laws. Although this implies
that a :finding of patent misuse does not require a :finding of an antitrust violation,28 antitrust notions have had a strong influence on the
effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the
particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent." 314 U.S. at 494.
25. 314 U.S. at 494. According to the Court, although the "patent monopoly carries out a
public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive
Right . . .' to their 'new and useful' inventions," the monopoly covers nothing "that is not
embraced in the invention." 314 U.S. at 492.
The Court noted that relief would be permitted when the improper practice had been abandoned and the misuse had been dissipated. Dissipation of a misuse can occur before, during,
or after trial. See DeLong v. Lemco Hosiery Mills, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (M.D.N.C.
1963). See generally Nordhaus, Antitrust Laws and Public Policy in Relation to Patents, 3 DUQ,
L. REV. I, 17-22 (1964); Comment, Dissipation ofPatent Misuse, 1968 Wis. L. REV, 918.
26. See Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), discussed in note 32 iefra; National Lockwasher v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1943). The influence of antitrust notions on the patent policy developed despite earlier cases
which had indicated that an antitrust defense was irrelevant to a patent infringement suit. See
Brown Saddle Co. v. Troxel, 98 F. 620 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1899); Strait v. National Harrow, 51 F.
819 (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1892). Those cases were cited as late as 1941. See Wisconsin Aluminum
Research Foundation v. Vitamin Technologists, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 857, 867 (S.D. Cal. 1941),
National Lockwasher nicely illustrates the influence of antitrust policy on the patent-misuse
doctrine. In that case, the patentee licensed the manufacture of a nontangling spring washer. ·
The patentee's standard license agreement provided that the licensee would not manufacture
any nontangling spring washer that did not use the licensed patent. The court directed dismissal of the infringement complaint because the patentee had used its patent monopoly to suppress the manufacture and sale of competing unpatented articles. The patentee, according to
the court, had attempted "by means other than that of free competition to extend the bounds
of its lawful monopoly to make, use, and vend the patented device to the extent where such
device would be the only one available to a user of such an article." 137 F.2d at 256. Thus, the
court's opinion suggests that the suppression of competition is a legitimate concern of the misuse doctrine.
27. The Court noted that the issue was ''whether a court of equity will lend its aid to
protect the patent monopoly when the respondent is using it as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale ofan unpatented article." 314 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added),
The Court concluded the patentee who thus restrains competition cannot receive such aid. 314
U.S. at 491.
28. Accord, Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641
(I 947) ("though control of the unpatented article or device falls short of a prohibited restraint
of trade or monopoly, it will not be sanctioned"). q. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) ("if there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily
follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either Section I or Section 2
of the Sherman Act").
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patent-misuse doctrine. This can be seen in the Court's implication,
in a later case, that conduct offensive to the antitrust laws is, per se,
patent misuse. 29 Similarly, other courts have, by basing their misuse
decisions almost exclusively on competitive considerations, neglected the policy of the patent grant.30 In still other cases the alleged infringer could choose whether to base its misuse defense upon
either patent or antitrust policy. 31
Since the patent-misuse doctrine rests on both antitrust and patent law, 32 we will examine the legality of total-sales royalties in light
of both policies. This Note argues that both policies are frustrated
by this kind of royalty provision.
JI.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONDITIONING TEST

This Note now moves to its discussion of the patent-misuse doctrine as it has been applied to total-sales royalties. The Supreme
Court first assessed the validity of total-sales royalties in Automatic
29. See United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957). National Gypsum, on the ground that United States Gypsum had been convicted of antitrust
violations, refused to pay royalties until a licensing agreement which had no price-fixing provisions was reached. When United States Gypsum sued to recover royalties due under the existing license agreement, National Gypsum argued that United States Gypsum "was barred
from recovery by reason of unpurged misuse of the patents involved . . . ." 352 U.S. at 462.
The Court remanded the case to the disttjct court for evidence on the patent-misuse issue. The
Court noted that "the only patent misuse that has ever been established in this long-drawn-out
litigation is concerted price fixing under the former patent licenses ..." and reasoned that
United States Gypsum could not recover if the misuse found in the antitrust litigation remained unpurged. 352 U.S. at 472-73. That reasoning suggests that the Court considered
United States Gypsum's prior Sherman Act violation to be patent misuse.
30. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950),
discussed in text at notes 33-42 i'!fra. The Court's failure to consider patent policy is noted in
Justice Douglas' dissenL 339 U.S. at 836.
31. See, e.g., Speny Prods., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901 (E.D.
, Ohio 1959), o/fd in part and revd in part, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960).
32. In Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), for
example, the opinion seems grounded in both antitrust and patent policy. The Court wrote,
"The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is
measured by the anti-trust laws not by the patent law." 320 U.S. at 684. The Court, however,
must not have intended to abandon the patent-policy basis for misuse, since it also invoked
that policy when withholding equitable relief from the patentee. 320 U.S. at 684. See
generally Wood, The Tangle ofMercoid Case Implications, l3 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 79-81
(1944).
The misuse doctrine has often been criticized. One commentator has proposed that misuse
should remain a defense in patent-infringement actions only where the conduct of the patentee
either is or is intended to be anticompetitive. Wallace, Proper Use of the Patent Misuse
J)octrine, 26 MERCER L. REV. 813 (1975). For a further discussion of this notion, see Marquis,
Limitations on Patent License Restrictions: Some Observations, 58 IOWA L. REV. 41 (1972).
Still another commentator would enact legislation to ensure that the courts scrutinize patentlicensing provisions under the rule of reason. Comment, The Patent-Antitrnst Balance: Proposalsfar Change, 17 VILL. L. REV. 463 (1972). For a general analysis of the most recent congressional activity in the area of patent-license provisions, see Bowes, Patent Law Reform and the
Expansion of Provisions Relating to Licensing, 8 LOY. CHI. L.J. 279 (1977).
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Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Jnc. 33 Automatic
Radio, a manufacturer of radio-broadcasting receivers, had entered
into a licensing agreement which entitled it to use, in the manufacture of its "home products," any or all of the 570 patents which were
held by Hazeltine or might be acquired by it. In exchange for the
license, Automatic agreed to pay a small percentage of the selling
price of its complete radio-broadcasting receivers. 34 Under this
agreement, Automatic was not obliged to use any of the licensed patents but was required to pay royalties whether or not they were used.
Hazeltine sued to recover royalties due under the agreement, and
Automatic defended by arguing that the total-sales royalty provision
constituted patent misuse.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the court of appeals, held that a total-sales royalty provision, even among related
businesses, was not a per se misuse of patents. 35 The Court distinguished total-sales royalty provisions from the previously prohibited
tie-in provisions, thereby rejecting the licensee's claim that a totalsales royalty provision "ties" the payment of royalties on unpatented
goods to the grant of a license. According to the Court, a tie-in provision extends "the monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly or restraint of competition,"36 while a total-sales royalty
provision does not restrain competition beyond the legitimate grant
of the patent. Although the Court noted that convenience alone
33. 339 U.S. 827 (1950). An earlier case, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364 (1948), involved a licensing agreement whereby the licensee paid a stipulated percent•
age of the selling price of "all plaster board and gypsum wall board of every kind" whether or
not made by patented processes or embodying patented inventions. 333 U.S. at 381. The
Court, however, decided the case on other grounds and held that the patentee had restrained
trade in violation of the Sherman Act by fixing prices of patented gypsum board and by eliminating production of unpatented board. The Court was influenced by the presence of the
percentage total-sales royalty provision: "Patents grant no privilege to their owners of organizing the.use of those patents to monopolize an industry through price control, lhroug/1 royalties
for thepatents drawn.frompaten/free industryproducts and through regulation of distribution."
333 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added). The opinion, however, did not directly ask whether the
provision, standing alone, constituted patent misuse. That is, the Court considered the totalsales royalty provision in the context of a Sherman Act violation, not in the context of a licen•
see's defense to a patentee's infringement or breach-of-contract suit.
34. 339 U.S. at 829.
35. 339 U.S. at 834. The district court had sustained the validity of the licensing agreement, had entered judgment for an accounting and recovery of royalties, and had enjoined the
licensee from failing to pay royalties, keep records, and render reports during the life of the
agreement.. 77 F. Supp. 493 (D. Mass. 1948). The court of appeals affirmed. 176 F.2d 799 (1st
Cir. 1949).
36. 339 U.S. at 832. As examples of tie-in provisions, the Court cited those instances where
the patentee licenses its patent on the condition that the licensee either (1) purchase an unpatented good, (2) promise not to produce or sell a competing good, or (3) accept the license of
another patent. 339 U.S. at 830-31.
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could not justify the unlawful extension of the patent monopoly, 37
the Court also invoked, in part, the reasoning of the lower courts that
the royalty provision was a convenient and legitimate method of calculating royalties. The district court, for example, noted that a totalsales royalty makes it unnecessary for firms to determine the extent
to which the licensee's products embody one of the licensed patents. 38
Automatic Radio is also significant because the Court upheld the
validity of total-sales royalty provisions without expressly considering the purposes and policies of the patent grant. 39 Indeed, the
Court's opinion suggests that misuse will be found only when the
patentee's conduct has anticompetitive effects.40 In dissent, Justice
Douglas criticized this failure of the Court to remember that "the
power of Congress to grant patents is circumscribed by the Constitution."41 Justice Douglas recognized that a total-sales royalty provision, like a tie-in provision, may compensate the patentee for
unpatented products. He wrote: "[T]he patent owner has therefore
used the patents to bludgeon his way into a partnership with this
licensee, collecting royalties on unpatented as well as patented articles. . . . A plainer extension of a patent by unlawful means would
be hard to imagine."42 Although Justice Douglas was correct in criticizing total-sales royalties on "patent policy" grounds, the most telling criticism of a total-sales royalty rests not on the fact that it
compensates the patentee for unpatented products, but on its undesirable economic consequences. This criticism will be elaborated
upon below.
The Supreme Court did not again rule on the validity of totalsales royalty provisions until Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 43 As in Automatic Radio, the dispute involved a standard Hazeltine license for all Hazeltine's domestic radio and
television patents; it called for a royalty of a percentage of the licen37. 339 U.S. at 834.
38. 339 U.S. at 833. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court on the
ground that, because it would not be unlawful to pay a fixed royalty, it was permissible to pay
a variable consideration measured by a percentage of the licensee's sales.
39. For this policy, see notes 20 & 25 supra and accompanying text.
40. This can be seen in the Court's definition of patent misuse as "an extension of the
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly or restraint of competition." 339 U.S. at
832 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court concluded that the total-sales royalty "does not create another monopoly; it creates no restraint of competition beyond the legitimate grant of the
patent." 339 U.S. at 833.
41. 339 U.S. at 836.
42. 339 U.S. at 838.
43. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
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see's sales of radios and televisions.44 When the license agreement
expired, the licensee (Zenith), asserting that it no longer required a
license, refused to renew it. Hazeltine brought a patent-infringement
suit, and Zenith responded that the patent was invalid.45 As part of
its defense and as part of a later counterclaim for treble damages and
injunctive relief, Zenith contended that Hazeltine had misused its
patents.46
The district court addressed the infringement issue first and held
the patent invalid. On the misuse counterclaim, the court held that
Hazeltine had misused its domestic patents by coercing Zenith to
accept a five-year package license47 and by insisting on royalties for
unpatented products.48 The court enjoined the patentee from "conditioning" the grant of a license upon the licensee's payment of royalties on the sale of products "not covered by the_ patent."49 The
court of appeals agreed that the patent was invalid, but on the misuse counterclaim it concluded that conditioning the grant of a license
upon the payment of royalties on the sale of products which made no
use of the patent was not patent misuse. Accordingly, the court reversed this portion of the district court's injunction.50
44. The district court described Hazeltine's licensing policy as follows:
Plaintiff's policy ... was to grant a so-called standard package license which conferred
on the licensees for a five-year period freedom from any charge of infringement under all
present as well as future Hazeltine patents issuing during the term of the agreement. Royalties were required to be paid on the licensee's entire production whether its products employed any or none ofthe Hazeltine patents. The license was in effect a covenant not to sue
the licensee or its customers should Hazeltine decide within the license period that the
manufacture and sale of any particular apparatus infringed upon any of its patent rights.
239 F. Supp. 51, 69-70 (1965) (emphasis added).
45. 239 F. Supp. at 54.
46. 239 F. Supp. at 69. Zenith also sought treble damages and injunctive relief for Hazeltine's alleged conspiracy with foreign patent pools. Zenith contended that the patent pools had
refused to license to Zenith those patents, including Hazeltine's, which had been placed within
their exclusive licensing authority. The district court found that Hazeltine had conspired with
the pools in violation of the antitrust laws and awarded Zenith an injunction and treble dam•
ages of nearly $35,000,000. The court of appeals reversed this judgment on the ground that
Zenith had failed to show actual injury. 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967). The Court reversed in
part, holding that, for some of the patent pools, Zenith had met its burden of showing injury.
This portion of the case is considered in 395 U.S. at 113-33.
47. For a discussion of package license provisions, see text at notes 69-70 iefra.
48. See 239 F. Supp. at 68-72, 77. The court enjoined Hazeltine from engaging in further
misuse and awarded Zenith $150,000 in treble damages. See note 49 iefra.
49. The injunction is printed, in part, in 395 U.S. at 133-34. It prohibited Hazeltine from
"'[c]onditioning directly or indirectly the grant of a license to ... Zenith ... upon the taking
of a license under any other patent or upon the paying ofroyalties on t/1e manefacture, use or sale
of apparatus not covered by such patent.'" 395 U.S. at 133-34 (emphasis original).
50. The court of appeals achieved this by deleting the last clause of the injunction. See
note 49 supra. It should be noted that the court of appeals' resolution of the total-sales royalty
issue did not lead it to reverse the district court's award of treble damages. Instead, the court
affirmed the treble damage award because Hazeltine's coercive attempts to induce a packagelicensing agreement constituted misuse.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "conditioning the
grant of a license upon payment of royalties on products which do
not use the teaching of the patent does amount to patent misuse."51
The Court carefully pointed out that the parties could, for purposes
of mutual convenience, use a total-sales royalty provision. 52 The
Court's rule only prohibited "conditioning" a license upon the payment of royalties on unpatented products, "that is, where the patentee refuses to license on any other basis and leaves the licensee with
the choice between a license so providing and no license at all." 53
Indeed, the Court noted that a licensee "may insist upon paying only
for use, and not on the basis of total sales." 54
This conditioning test permitted the Court to distinguish rather
than overrule Automatic Radio. According fo the Court, Automatic
Radio was not inconsistent with the district court's injunction
against conditioning a license upon the payment of royalties on unpatented products.55 Automatic Radio, wrote the Court, did not discuss the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the royalty
formula and thus did not rely on a finding that the patentee had used
its patent leverage to coerce a total-sales royalty provision. Thus the
Court concluded that Automatic Radio did not authorize the patentee to override the protestations of the licensee.56
Justice Harlan dissented from the majority's treatment of patent
misuse, and described it as holding that a "patent license provision
which measures royalties by a percentage of total sales is lawful if
included for the 'convenience' of both parties but unlawful if 'in51. 395 U.S. at 135. Since the district court's treble damage award for patent misuse was
affirmed by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court only discussed whether the court of appeals was correct in striking the last clause of the injunction. 395 U.S. at 133.
52. 395 U.S. at 138. It is often more convenient to base royalties on the sale of products,
regardless of whether the product uses the teaching of the patent. See note 38 supra and
accompanying text. See also text at note 106 i,!fra.
53. 395 U.S. at 135. For a further definition of conditioning, see text at note 11 supra.
54. 395 U.S. at 139.
55. 395 U.S. at 138.
56. Its conclusion that the legality of a total-sales royalty provision should be determined
by a conditioning test did not lead the Court to affirm the injunction. First, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether Hazeltine had "conditioned"
its license upon the inclusion of this provision. Second, the Court held that a finding of patent
misuse would not necessarily establish a Clayton Act violation. That Jiolding settled a longdebated question. According to the Court, patent misuse does not, in itself, violate the antitrust laws and, before an injunction can be granted, the ingredients of an antitrust violation
must be established. Nonetheless, a showing of misuse is a defense for the licensee and precludes any injunction against infringement by the licensee. The holding that patent misuse
does not necessarily violate the antitrust laws implies that the competitive restraints that constitute patent misuse are not as extensive as those constituting a violation of the antitrust laws.
See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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sisted upon' by the patentee."57 Justice Harlan predicted that difficulties in applying the conditioning test would produce undesirable
uncertainty in this area of business. The test, according to Justice
Harlan, would force courts to evaluate negotiations artfully embellished by wary patentees and would give little assurance to the parties that their agreements would be enforced. Justice Harlan also
contended that the majority had, in effect, overruled Automatic
Radio. He read Automatic Radio as holding that total-sales royalty
agreements do not constitute misuse, even if they were insisted upon
by the patentee. The majority opinion, J1,1stice Harlan insisted,
found misuse in a patent license of "precisely the same tenor" as that
upheld in Automatic Radio and did so "without offering more than a
shadow of a reason in law or economics for departing from that earlier ruling." 58 He saw no reason why this method of calculating the
amount of royalties should be any less permissible than other alternatives, whether or not it is "insisted upon" by the patentee. 59
Justice Harlan concluded by attempting to show that the conditioning test failed to achieve any of its possible purposes. He argued
that if the Court intended to protect licensees against overreaching, it
failed to explain why licensees as a class need this protection60 or
why royalties based solely upon use could not be equally overreaching. If the Court thought that total-sales royalties discouraged the
licensee from "inventing around" the patent or acquiring substitutes,
Justice Harlan argued that these effects would be present even if the
parties freely bargained for the provision. 61 According to Justice
Harlan, the Court did not address the critical issue: whether totalsales royalties without exception constitute patent misuse. 62 He considered but rejected as insufficient the argument that percentage-ofsales royalty provisions are economically undesirable.63 Given the
57. 395 U.S. at 141.
58. 395 U.S. at 142.
59. Other alternatives would include the payment of a fixed sum to acquire a license for a
given period of time and the use of royalties based upon the sale of items which use the patent's teaching.
60. One commentator has asserted, "As a class patent licensees are unlikely candidates for
'ward of the court' status, and the cases that rest on the premise of overreaching are likely to be
unsound, either in their reasoning or in both reasoning and result." Baxter, Legal Reslriclions
on Exploitation efthe Paten/ Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
61. In a later part of this Note, this argument will be made and supported. See text at Part
III.C infra.
62. 395 U.S. at 142.
63. Baxter, supra note 60, condemned all royalties based on the sale of end products. See
note 6 supra. That is, he condemned not only total-sales royalties, but also those royalties
based on the sale of end products which use the patent. This Note argues more modestly that
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choice between holding total-sales royalty provisions valid or invalid, Justice Harlan asserted that he would adhere to the rule of
Automatic Radio and uphold all total-sales royalty provisions.
This Note will argue that while many of Justice Harlan's criticisms of the Zenith test are well taken, his conclusion that all totalsales royalty provisions should be upheld is unwise. Because of their
undesirable economic consequences, all total-sales royalty provisions
should be condemned as patent misuse.

III. CRITICISMS OF THE ZENITH DECISION
Three specific criticisms of the Zenith conditioning test can be
made. First, the Court failed to explain adequately its reasoning.
Second, applying the Zenith test properly may be difficult. Finally,
an economic analysis of total-sales royalty provisions suggests that
they misuse the patent grant.
A.

The Rationale of the Zenith .Decision

As Justice Harlan said, the language of the majority opinion in
Zenith makes it difficult to discern precisely why a total-sales royalty
provision constitutes patent misuse only when it is insisted upon by
the patentee. The Court spoke conclusorily, asserting only that this
kind of royalty provision unlawfully extends the patent monopoly.
This section briefly dissects the possible justifications for the conditioning test.
First, the Court explained its decision with an analogy to the tiein cases. The tie-in cases, as we have seen, prohibit a patentee from
"conditioning" the right to use the patent on the licensee's agreement
to purchase, use, or sell another product not within the scope of the
patentee's monopoly. 64 The Zenith Court reasoned that
just as the patent's leverage may not he used to extract from the licensee a commitment to purchase, use, or sell other products according to
the desires of the patentee, neither can that leverage be used to gamer
as royalties a percentage share of the licensee's receipts from sales of
other products; in either case, the patentee seeks to extend the monopoly of his patent to derive a benefit not attributable to use of the patent's teaching. 65

The Court, then, suggested that conditioning, for both tie-ins and
total-sales royalties, is illegal.
total-sales royalties, as distinguished from other percentage-of-sale royalties based on patent
use, have uniquely undesirable economic consequences. For further discussion, see notes 12327 iefra and accompanying text.
64. See note 36 supra.
65. 395 U.S. at 136.
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That reasoning, however, is clearly unpersuasive. As the Court's
confusion over the term "conditioning" illustrates, the Court failed
to recognize the distinction between its holding and the reasoning of
the tie-in cases. As used in the Zenith opinion, "conditioning" the
grant of a license relates to the licensor's decision whether to grant
the license. Under the Zenith test, it is unlawful to grant a license
only upon the "condition" that the licensee pay royalties on products
which do not use the teaching of the patent. It is the refusal to grant
the license without this provision that the Court condemns as "conditioning." The tie-in cases, on the other hand, make the negotiations irrelevant and simply condemn, as a per se misuse, including in
a license a "condition" which ties the sale ofunpatented materials to
the sale or license of the patented product.66
Furthermore, if tie-in and total-sales royalty provisions are
analogous, logic requires that they be treated similarly. If tie-in provisions are per se misuse, total-sales royalty provisions should be
condemned. But, while purporting to analogize tie-in and total-sales
royalty provisions, the Court treats the two provisions quite differently. The tie-in cases, for example, reveal that a finding of a tie-in
inevitably leads to a finding of misuse even if the patentee gave the
licensee other alternatives or the licensee freely agreed to the provision. Zenith, on the other hand, held that a coerced total-sales royalty provision is misuse, while a freely negotiated one is not. This
odd result suggests that the Zenith Court considered total-sales royalty provisions less onerous than tie-in provisions; it suggests that, in
some way, the evils of total-sales royalties vanish when there has
been no conditioning and the agreement was freely bargained for.
As Justice Harlan pointed out, however, the Court failed to explain
why a coerced acceptance of the royalty extends the patent monopoly while a freely negotiated acceptance does not. In either case, the
patentee may "derive a benefit not attributable to the patent's teaching."67
66. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S, 502 (1917).
The Zenith Court cited two cases other than Motion Picture and Morion Sall to demonstrate that patentees may not "condition the right to use [the] patent on the licensee's agreement to purchase, use or sell . . . another article of commerce not within the patent
monopoly." 395 U.S. at 136. Although both opinions appeared to hold that tie-in provisions
violate the antitrust laws even though they are freely bargained for, both opinions did evidence
sensitivity to the coercive aspects of tie-in provisions. See International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 45559 (1940). This sensitivity to coercion explains, perhaps, why the court cited these cases in lieu
of Motion Picture and Morton Salt. Neither court, however, focussed on the negotiation process or relied on coercion in reaching its decision. Thus the general rule remains the same: tiein provisions are per se violations of the patent and antitrust laws, and even a freely bargainedfor tie-in provision is patent misuse.
61. See 395 U.S. at 136.
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A second explanation for the Court's adoption of the conditioning test may be that it relied too heavily on the logic of the district
court's injunction.68 Besides enjoining the conditioning of the totalsales royalty provision, the district court prohibited the patentee
from refusing to grant a license unless the licensee acquired other
patents. The courts have condemned this practice as "mandatory
package licensing."69 Package licensing is not economically undesirable if the licensee desires rights to all the patents in the package;70 it
is only objectionable when the patentee forces the licensee to pay for
undesired patents. Since the misuse associated with mandatory
package licensing lends itself to expression in terms of "conditioning," and since both total-sales royalties and mandatory package
licenses were similarly prohibited by the district court injunction, the
Zenith Court may simply have assumed that total-sales royalty
provisions are also undesirable only when "insisted upon." However, it is not at all clear that total-sales royalty provisions should be
condemned only when the bargaining process is characterized by
conditioning. Indeed, it will be argued below that the undesirable
economic consequences of total-sales royalty provisions are not escaped when the parties freely bargain for the provision.71
Third, the decision may also have resulted from the Court's concern with overreaching by patentees_. That interpretation is substantiated by the Court's implication that what is being condemned is the
patentee's use of "leverage." 72 If the decision rests on this ground,
however, it is unsatisfactory. Since the Court concedes that a pur68. The injunction, quoted in note 49 supra, treated both the total-sales royalty and the
patent package in one sentence. The court prohibited both provisions if they arose from conditioning.
69. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 154 F. Supp. 890 (D. Del. 1957),
ajfd., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959), held that mandatory package
licensing is a misuse of patents. See 13 HARV. L. REV. 1628 (1960). q. International Mfg. Co.
v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 988 (1965) (the packaging
of "blocking patents" which are so interrelated that they may reasonably be considered to
constitute parts of a single distinct product does not constitute misuse). For an economic analysis of package licenses, see Note, Coercive Patent Package Licensing--The Needfar a Rufe ef
Reason, 14 WM. & MARYL. REV. 748 (1973). It argues that some benefits of package licenses
may outweigh their economic disadvantages and proposes that the economic costs and benefits
be balanced under a "rule of reason" judicial standard.
70. It should be noted, however, that a nonmandatory package license may cause difficulty
if the licensing agreement fails to provide for the reduction of royalties as the patents in the
package expire. See Comment, Unreduced Royalty Arrangements and Packaged Patents: An
Improper Extension efthe Patent Monopoly?, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1248 (1968).
7 l. See text at Part III.C infra.
72. See 395 U.S. at 136.
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pose of the patent grant is to give the patentee "leverage" to garner
high royalties,73 why should total-sales royalty provisions, as opposed to any other type of royalty provision, be singled out as particularly objectionable if "leverage" or "coercion" has been used?
Rather, under the Court's reasoning, all types of royalty provisions
should be condemned if conditioning is proved. Thus, the "leverage" rationale for the conditioning test, absent any additional economic or patent-policy justification, is insufficient.
This Part suggests, then, that the Zenith Court failed to justify
adequately the conditioning test. The Court apparently believed
that the ills of total-sales royalty provisions are avoided if the parties
freely bargain. The Court, however, did not say why this is so: it
simply concluded that conditioning the grant of a license upon acceptance of a total-sales royalty provision unlawfully extends the
patent monopoly.
B.

Judicial Application of the Conditioning Test

In his dissent in Zenith, Justice Harlan said that the conditioning
test would prove "exceedingly difficult to apply" and would therefore cause "uncertainty in this area of business dealing." 74 He anticipated that "[i]n practice, it often will be very hard to tell whether a
license provision was included at the instance of both parties or only
at the will of the licensor."75 This Part tests the accuracy of that
prediction and concludes that, despite the apparent ease with which
the lower courts have applied the Zenith test, it will pose practical
difficulties for the courts. While these difficulties may not, standing
alone, justify overruling Zenith, they at least significantly decrease
its desirability.
I.

The Conditioning Test in the Lower Courts

The principles on which the lower courts have relied in applying
the conditioning test can be readily stated. In order to find patent
misuse under the Zenith test, a court must determine that the patentee has conditioned its grant of a license on the licensee's acceptance
of a total-sales royalty provision.76 In Zenith, the Supreme Court
73. 395 U.S. at 135, 136 (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964)).
74. 395 U.S. at 141.
75. 395 U.S. at 141.
76. See Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Frontier of the Northeast, Inc., 441 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp.,
433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1970); Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus.,
Inc., 420 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970); Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Md. 1972), rm/. on other grounds, 489 F.2d 231
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held,77 as have the lower courts,78 that conditioning cannot be inferred merely because the license agreement includes such a provision. Accordingly, the courts have placed the burden of introducing
evidence of coercion or conditioning on the licensee.79 Courts ask (1)
whether the provision was bargained for or insisted upon, 80 (2)
whether the licensee made protests which were overridden by the
licensor,81 (3) whether the patentee rejected the licensee's alternative
proposals, 82 and (4) whether the patentee failed to offer reasonable
alternatives. 83 Finally, although most courts have not construed
Zenith as requiring the patentee to show that the parties used the
provision for their mutual convenience, some courts have suggested
that a provision's convenience or mutual benefit will be weighed in
deciding whether it was freely bargained for. 84
A number of cases support these propositions and illustrate the
apparent ease with which the courts have applied the Zenith test. In
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1973); Chandler v. Stem Dental Laboratory Co., 335 F.
Supp. 580 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories,
Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Mutchnik v. M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610, 337 A.2d
72 (1975).
77. The Court stated:
No such inference [of conditioning] follows from a mere license provision measuring royalties by the licensee's total sales even if, as things work out, only some or none of the
merchandise employs the patented idea or process, or even ifit was foreseeable that some
undetermined portion would not contain the invention.
395 U.S. at 138.
78. Most lower courts have correctly looked to evidence beyond the face of the agreement
itself. See, e.g., Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970). Bui see Chandler v. Stem Dental Laboratory Co., 335 F. Supp.
580 (S.D. Tex. 1971), discussed in text at notes 100-02 infra.
79. See, e.g., Mutchnik v. M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610, 619, 337 A.2d 75, 76 (1975).
Similarly, the court in Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc., 330
F. Supp. 441,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), held that the licensee had the burden of showing "a posture
on the part of the [patentee] which rejected alternative proposals by the [licensee]."
80. Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Frontier of the Northeast, Inc., 441 F.2d 67, 73 n.10 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971); Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319,
321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970); Mutchnik v. M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610,
337 A.2d 75 (1975).
81. See cases cited in note 80 supra.
82. Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441,
443 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
83. See Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc., 330 F. Supp.
441,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
84. See, e.g., Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (1971),
discussed in text at notes 95-98 infra, where the court stated that
Plaintiff has failed to show that the License Contract involved was executed for the mutual convenience of the parties. In fact it is clear that its purpose was for the sole monetary convenience of the plaintiff. . . . If the reason for employing the royalty provision
which is based on total sales is the mutual convenience of both of the parties rather than
as leverage from which the licensor can extract payment for the manufacture of unpatented items, there is no patent misuse.
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Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc. ,85
for example, the licensing agreement provided for a fixed royalty on
each corneal contact lens sold by the licensee. 86 The agreement, in
other words, required the licensee to p;y royalties even on the manufacture and sale of lenses which did not embody or make use of the
patent. When the plaintiff, an assignee of the patent, sued to recover
royalties under the license agreement, the licensee replied that royalties based on total sales rather than solely on patent use constituted
misuse. The court rejected the licensee's argument, finding that the
Zenith conditioning test had not been met. In support of its conclusion that the licensee had entered into the agreement freely, voluntarily, and with full understanding of its terms, the court relied on the
plaintiffs offer of an alternative proposal calling for royalties, at
slightly higher rates per end product, only upon the sale of those
lenses which use the patent. 87 The court noted that, during the negotiations, defendants had been represented by counsel, and it found
no evidence that the plaintiff had induced the contract by misrepresentation or by physical or economic duress. 88 Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not refused to license on a basis other
than a total-sales royalty.89
The court in Mutchnik v. MS. Willett, Inc. 90 considered a somewhat more complex set of facts. The plaintiff, Mutchnik, had
granted the defendant, Willett, a ten-year exclusive license to manufacture and sell a metal table slide. The agreement specified that
Willett, or any of its sub-licensees, would pay royalties of five percent of the highest gross invoiced prices of its slides. The agreement
further provided that if Willett or any of its sub-licensees manufactured or sold any slide not covered by the Mutchnik design, the five-.
percent royalty would also apply. When the plaintiff sued to recover
royalties under the contract, the licensee argued that an agreement
85. 330 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
86. In this case, the agreement provided:
Licensee, solely for the purpose of accounting hereunder, agrees to pay Solex royalties
upon such devices consisting of pieces of finished material in which two lens surfaces are
applied thereto and which are adapted to be or are made into a finished or unfinished
corneal contact lens calculated in accordance with the following schedule on all such devices sold by Licensee.
330 F. Supp. at 442 (emphasis added). This provision, then, provided for a "flat-rate" totalsales royalty to be paid upon the product's sale. See note 7 supra.
87: 330 F. Supp. at 443.
88. 330 F. Supp. at 442.
89. 330 F. Supp. at 444.
90. 274 Md. 610, 337 A.2d 72 (1975).
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requiring that royalties be paid on items other than those described
and claimed in the patent constituted patent misuse.
The lower court accepted the misuse defense and found that illegal conditioning of the license had been established.91 The lower
court reasoned that Mutchnik, aware ofWillett's substantial toolingup expense in expectation of a license grant, had exerted "leverage"
by insisting on the provision and that Mutchnik's tactic of indicating
that others were interested in the patent pressured the licensee. The
appellate court reversed. It placed the burden of showing coercion
on the licensee92 and concluded that the evidence relied upon by the
lower court did not support a finding of conditioning under the
Zenith test: ''There is no evidence that the Mutchniks refused to license on any basis other than a total-sales royalty, or overrode any
objection which Willett may have had to the provision, or rejected
any alternative proposal which Willett may have advanced."93 Indeed, the court doubted that the total-sales royalty was ever a "bone
of contention" between the parties, much less that it was demanded
by the Mutchniks.94
In contrast to the courts in the above two cases, the court in Glen
Manefacturing Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc. ,95 found patent misuse under the conditioning test. As in the previously mentioned
cases, the licensing agreement based royalties on total sales rather
than solely on patent use.96 The court explained that the patentee,
by consistently employing a standardized total-sales royalty provision in numerous licensing agreements over a three-year period, had
· established a policy of refusing to grant licenses unless they con91. See 274 Md. at 614, 337 A.2d at 74.
92. 274 Md. at 618,337 A.2d at 76. Indeed, the court explicitly declined to construe Zenith
as holding that the payment of royalties on unpatented goods, except for the convenience of
the parties, constitutes patent misuse. 274 Md. at 620, 337 A.2d at 77.
93. 274 Md. at 619, 337 A.2d at 76.
94. 274 Md. at 619, 337 A.2d at 76.
95. 324 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Glen, the plaintiff, held a patent on toilet-tank
covers. The district court originally held that Glen's licensing agreement with the defendant,
Perfect Fit, constituted a patent misuse because it required the payment of royalties on all
toilet-tank covers sold by Perfect Fit and not only on those within the scope of the patent 299
F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This holding was affirmed in a supplemental opinion. 299 F.
Supp. at 283.
The Second Circuit, citing the then-recent Court decision in Zenith, remanded the case to
the district court "for further findings on the issue of 'conditioning' and an explicit determination of whether the license amounted to patent misuse under Zeniih." Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970) (footnote
omitted).
On remand, the district court held that the patentee's conditioning of the license on payment of a royalty on the total sales of toilet-tank covers made the contract unenforceable
against the manufacturer. 324 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
96. This royalty provision is quoted in note 7 supra.
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tained such provisions.97 As further support for its conclusion, the
court noted that the plaintiff had charged other manufacturers with
infringement ~d had given them the choice of accepting the standard license or- discontinuing the manufacture of the product. Finally, the court found that the patentee had failed to rebut this proof
or show that the agreement was entered into for the mutual convenience of the parties.
Glen is significant for two reasons. First, it suggests that conditioning may be inferred from a licensor's practice of refusing to license without the inclusion of a total-sales royalty. Second, it
suggests that a finding of misuse does not depend on affirmative evidence that the licensee protested or requested some alternative form
of royalty arrangement.98 This may depart from language in Zenith
which notes that conditioning depends, in part, on the licensor's rejection of the licensee's alternative proposals and protests.99 To the
extent that other courts accept the Glen court's inferences, the licensee's task of proving conditioning will be eased.
Finally, in at least one case, Chandler v. Stern Dental Laboratory
Co., 100 the court simply misinterpreted the Zenith test. In that case,
the patentee alleged that the licensee had violated the antitrust and
patent laws, and, as in the other cases, the licensee contended that
total-sales royalty provisions constitute patent misuse. Although the
court concluded that the patentee insisted upon and coerced the licensee into accepting the provision, the agreement itself was apparently the only evidence upon which the court relied. 101 The Zenith
97. 324 F. Supp. at I 136-37.
98. A corollary of this proposition raises an intriguing question. As note 24 supra suggests,
patent misuse may be a defense to an infringement suit even though the infringer was not
harmed by the misuse. In other words, if an infringer refuses a licensing agreement providing
for an illegal tie-in provision, the infringer can raise the tie-in provision as a defense to the
patentee's infringement suit. In a total-sales royalty situation, however, it is unclear whether
the courts would permit an infringer who has refused a total-sales royalty provision to use later
evidence of the patentee's past practice of conditioning as a defense to an infringement suit.
On one hand, it can be argued that this situation is no different from that posed by the tie-in
cases: since conditioning licenses on total-sales royalties is just as undesirable as a tie-in provision. infringers should be able to raise patent misuse as a defense in both circumstances. On
the other hand, since the Zenith case holds that the mere use of a total-sales royalty is not per
se patent misuse, it might be reasonable to insist that the infringer show evidence of conditioning. If the infringer has refused the licensing arrangement, the infringer will be hard pressed to
show that he was "coerced" into accepting the license. In any event, a licensee who hasfteely
agreed to a total-sales royalty should not be permitted to use evidence of the patentee's past
history of conditioning as a defense to an infringement suit. If this were allowed, the conditioning test would be effectively circumvented, since the total-sales royalty was not imposed
upon the licensee.
99. 395 U.S. at 138, 139. For a discussion of those cases in accord with Zenith, see notes
16-84 supra and accompanying text.
100. 335 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
101. This conclusion is supported by the court's statement that
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rule, however, clearly requires external evidence of conditioning:
"no . . . inference [of conditioning] follows from the mere licensing
provision." 102
2.

Potential Problems Under the Zenith Test

As these cases show, the lower courts have easily applied the
Zenith conditioning test. Nevertheless, this facility may be more apparent than real. That is, the courts, by glossing over the practical
difficulties presented by the test, may have improperly applied it in
these cases. Or, this facility may simply reflect the fact that the
courts have not yet had to face the perplexities of evaluating the fairness of a total-sales royalty provision arising out of complex negotiations. To the extent that future cases involve such negotiations, the
Zenith test will be harder to apply and easier to misapply. 103
It might of course be argued that evidence that there had been
complex negotiations should simplify the judicial task. Such evidence might create a presumption that the parties freely bargained
for the total-sales royalty provision. Since, however, the patentee
might have been "careful to embellish the negotiations with an alternative proposal," 104 evidence of an alternative proposal would require the court to determine whether the alternative was offered in
good faith or was instead a calculated, subtle form of coercion. If
the patentee, for example, offered clearly unattractive alternatives to
the licensee, it might still be legitimately concluded that the patentee
had conditioned its grant of-the license on the licensee's acceptance
[A]t the trial plaintiffs asserted a right to receive royalties on certain thermoplastic sheets,
as well as similar teeth protector devices manufactured or sold by defendants. By plaintiff's own admissions these products do not come within the scope of the Chandler patent.
As a result, it is this Court's conclusion that the patent has been misused.
335 F. Supp. at 583.
The court also referred to the licensing provision which required that all the licensee's
improvements of the patent become the property of the original patentee, a kind of provision
commonly referred to as a "grant-back." The Chandler court seems to suggest that a grantback provision is evidence of conditioning. However, in Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v.
Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947), the Court held that grant-backs are not unenforceable per se and distinguished tie-ins from grant-backs. Tie-ins, according to the Court, expand
the monopoly power to nonpatented products while grant-backs involve "using one legalized
monopoly to acquire another legalized monopoly." 329 U.S. at 644. This language suggests,
contrary to the Chandler court's inference, that the mere inclusion of a grant-back in a license
which includes a total-sales royalty is not sufficient proof of use of leverage to satisfy the
conditioning test. For a judicial history and economic analysis of grant-backs, see Co=ent,
The Validity of Grant-Back Clauses in Patent Licensing Agreements, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 733
(1975).
102. 395 U.S. at 138.
103. See 395 U.S. at 141 (Harlan J., dissenting).
104. This was the concern expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Zenith. 395 U.S. at
142.
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of the total-sales royalty provision. Thus, a total-sales royalty provision should not be deemed "bargained for" simply because the negotiations were complex or because the patentee offered alternative
proposals. 105
The problems with a test which requires a subsequent judicial
evaluation of the parties' negotiations are obvious. First, the court
must perform the difficult task of determining the reasonableness of
the patentee's alternative proposals in light of the economic conditions at the time of the negotiations rather than at the time of the
suit. Suppose a patentee offers to license its patent for either a totalsales or a fixed lump-sum royalty. Although the court could assess
the reasonableness of the patentee's alternative lump-sum proposal
by comparing the amount actually paid under the total-sales royalty
with the amount proposed under the fixed lump-sum royalty, this
may lead to the wrong result.
For instance, the court could be easily led to assume that an alternative lump-sum royalty offered by the licensor was reasonable
simply because it would have yielded lower royalty payments than
those actually made under the total-sales royalty. This situation
would result if the parties failed to anticipate that the licensee would
either (1) sell end products on which a royalty is due even though the
end product made no use of the patent or (2) improve the end product so as to increase its sales. To the extent the parties miscalculated
at the time of negotiations, then, the alternative lump-sum proposal
ought to be deemed unreasonable even though the licensee would
have paid less under it than under the total-sales royalty provision.
As the above example illustrates, a second related difficulty with
the Zenith test is that it not only requires the court to gauge the economic conditions at the time of the negotiations, but it also requires
the court to reconstruct the parties' perceptions of and forecasts for
the various proposals. Since those perceptions an4 forecasts are extremely speculative when made, and since those of the patentee may
differ from those of the licensee, they resist judicial reconstruction.
A third difficulty with the Zenith test is that the court, in determining the reasonableness of the licensor's alternatives, must recog105. This problem is not unknown in patent litigation. In package-licensing cases, see text
at note 69 supra, courts frequently evaluate the reasonableness of the patentee's alternative
offers to determine if the patentee had coerced the licensee to accept a package-licensing provision. A good example of this can be found in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
239 F. Supp. 51, 69-72 (N.D. Ill. 1965), qffd in relevant part, 388 F.2d 25, 33-34 (7th Cir. 1967),
qffd in part and revd in part on other grounds, 395 U.S. 100 (1969). The court of appeals noted,
for example, that the patentee's alternative offers were "a transparent attempt" to force the
licensee to accept a package-licensing arrangement.
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nize that total-sales proposals typically provide for a lower royalty
rate than royalty proposals based solely on patent use. A total-sales
royalty is often convenient for the licensor-it facilitates the administration of the license and allows the licensor to avoid many of the
infringement problems and litigation expenses that may be encountered if royalties are paid only on the sale of end products which use
the patent's teaching. Accordingly, royalty proposals based solely on
patent use ought to reflect the risk of these additional costs. Somewhat similarly, the court must also be aware of an additional reason
for higher royalty rates when a royalty is based solely on patent use:
since a royalty based on patent use means that royalties will be paid
upon a smaller group of end products, the patentees charge a higher
rate per end product sold. Both of these factors are easy to overlook,
difficult to calculate, and make the court's evaluation of alternatives
less precise. 106
Since courts commonly reconstruct past events, the difficulties
presented by the Zenith test should not be overplayed. Nevertheless,
the test, as Justice Harlan suggested, 107 requires judgments of unusual difficulty. This has two implications. First, the courts, in order
to reduce business uncertainty as well as to simplify their own decisions, may attempt to promulgate rules distinguishing bargained-for
from coerced agreements. The courts, for example, may decree that
certain types of alternative proposals are "per se" reasonable, so that
if the patentee offers those alternatives, the agreement on the totalsales royalty provision will be deemed freely bargained for. The
promulgation of such rules, however, must contravene the intent of
the Zenith test. In some instances the line drawn will be arbitrary,
while in other cases patentees will become adept at couching unreasonable alternative proposals in terms acceptable to the court. In
either case, the court would mistakenly approve coerced agreements.
Second, rather than rely on rules, the courts may continue to resolve these disputes case by case. This would only intensify business
uncertainty and, for that reason, would discourage total-sales royalty
provisions. Under the Zenith test, if the licensee failed to protest the
inclusion of a total-sales royalty provision, the validity of the provi106. A further difficulty should be mentioned. In Automatic Radio and Zenith, the license
agreements also provided that the licensee could use any patent subsequently acquired by the
licensor. Such provisions confuse the Court's analysis of alternative proposals because the
licensees speculate on the possibility that the licensor will acquire a valuable patent during the
term of the license. To the extent there is such a likelihood, the licensee will find the licensor's
proposal more attractive. A court, however, could not easily reconstruct and evaluate the effect that the "future patents" proposal had upon the bargaining process.
107. 395 U.S. at 141 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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sion would be relatively well assured. 108 But once the negotiations
focussed on the provision, uncertainty would arise. As was discussed
above, if the provision is to be upheld, the Zenith test suggests the
licensor develop a record of "reasonableness" by not rejecting the
licensee's alternative proposals and by offering alternatives of its
own. However, the licensor can never be certain that a court will
determine that the licensor acted reasonably. As a result, licensors,
rather than insisting upon a total-sales royalty provision and risking
the loss of a later infringement suit, may conclude that once the total-sales royalty becomes a "bone of contention," it should be abandoned altogether. Although it will be argued below that such
discouragement is desirable, this result was certainly not the goal of
the Zenith Court. Applying the Zenith test case by case might also
encourage courts to sanction total-sales royalties which are, in fact,
conditioned. The licensee's burden of showing conditioning normally can be met only if the licensee protested the total-sales royalty
provision and can document the negotiation process. 109 To the extent that this is too heavy a burden on the licensee, the courts may
uphold coerced agreements.
Finally, even if the Zenith test effectively prevents "coerced"
agreements, it still ought to be abandoned because it sanctions some
total-sales royalties. This Note now will argue that all such royalties
should constitute patent misuse.
C.

Total-Sales Royalties as Patent Misuse

The Zenith test is not only difficult to apply in practice; it is
fundamentally flawed in principle. Pace Justice Harlan, this Note
contends that all total-sales royalty provisions, regardless of whether
they have been "conditioned," have undesirable economic consequences and ought to constitute patent misuse. Because total-sales
royalties add a variable cost 110 to each end product 111 sold by the
licensee, they undermine the patent policy by discouraging inven108. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138 (1969). Bui see
Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (implying that
conditioning may be found even if the licensee fails to protest the provision).
109. See text at note 108 supra.
110. Variable costs are those costs which increase with the level of output. C. McCoN•
NELL, ECONOMICS 501 (6th ed. 1975). A total-sales royalty adds a variable cost to each end
product, since the required royalty payments will increase as sales and output increase. Fixed
costs, in contrast, do not vary with changes in output and must be paid even if the firm's output
is zero. Id. at 500. Since a fixed lump-sum royalty does not vary with production or sales, it is
a fixed cost. Net profit, of course, is the difference between total revenue and total costs (the
sum of fixed and variable costs).
11 l. See note 7 supra.
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tion, and they restrain competition by deterring licensees from entering new markets. So long as the licensee sells the product covered by
the royalty, the licensee must pay royalties on the sale of each end
product even though it makes no use of the patent; and since this
variable cost is unavoidable, 112 a total-sales royalty distorts the licensee's decisions. The next two sub-parts support and elaborate this
proposition.
1. Economic Effects upon the Patent Policy
The patent-misuse doctrine, we have said, is grounded in the patent grant's purpose: "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." 113 In neither Zenith nor Automatic Radio, however, did the
Court consider whether a royalty based on total sales rather than
solely on patent use disserves that policy and, if so, whether the conditioning test eliminates that disservice.
The first undesirable patent-policy consequence of a total-sales
royalty provision is that it discourages inventive activity by the licensee. Suppose that a manufacturer decides to produce a product
which uses an existing patent and that it agrees to pay royalties to the
licensor on the product's total sales. Since the licensee would have to
pay royalties even if the end product did not use the patent, substituting an internally developed patent for the licensed patent would
not reduce the end product's variable costs and the licensee would
have little incentive to invest in research and development to "invent
around" the licensed patent. In contrast, if the licensing arrangement provided for the payment of royalties only when the patent was
used, substituting a new patent would enable the licensee to avoid
paying the royalties for the original patent and would thereby reduce
the variable cost of each end product. The licensee, then, would
have a greater incentive to invest in research and development. 114
112. The variable cost can be avoided, of course, only if the licensee declines to sell products covered by the royalty.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942).
114. Suppose, for example, a company sells 500 units or end products of product A each
year. Further, suppose that product A embodies a patent and that the company enters into a
five-year license agreement with the patentee under which the company must pay $10 for each
unit it produces or sells which uses the teaching of the patent. During year I, the company
spends $10,000 on research and eventually develops an invention which can be substituted in
year 2 for the licensed patent. If it is assumed that the costs of producing the substitute and the
original are equal, substitution will result fa a reduction in royalty payments of $10 per unit
sold. (It is irrelevant whether the royalty is flat-rate or percentage.) This is true because the
company, under the licensing agreement, is not obligated to pay royalties on those units or end
products which make no use of the original patent. The savings which will result from this
substitution can be calculated as follows:
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Similarly, but more significantly, total-sales royalty provisions
discourage invention by diminishing the market opportunities for inventors other than licensees: a total-sales royalty provision gives a
licensee little reason to solicit a license on a substitute invention. For
example, again suppose that a manufacturer has licensed a patent
under a total-sales royalty provision. Further suppose that, by substituting a new patent for the licensed patent, the licensee could improve its end product so as to increase either its sales or sales price
and thereby increase its total revenue. Unfortunately for the licensee
and inventor, however, such a· substitution, far from lessening the
licensee's obligation to pay royalties on the sale of the end product,
would increase the licensee's royalty payments. 115 Substitution
would make economic sense only in those uncommon cases in which
the increase in the licensee's total revenue 116 or in his cost savings
outweighed the added royalties that would have to be paid to the
patentee of the substitute invention. 117 Licensees unable to project
units sold per year
royalties saved per unit sold
annual savings
remaining term of the license in years

500
X $10

$5000
X4

$20000

total royalties avoided
less: research and development costs

($10000)

net savings

$10000

(For purposes of simplification, savings have not been discounted to present values, as a more
accurate analysis would require.)
In contrast, if the company had entered into a total-sales arrangement, substitution would
not reduce its royalty payments for the original patent. Accordingly, it would make economic
sense to invest in research and development only if the production costs of the substitute invention were less than those of the patented item and variable costs were consequently lower.
The difficulty of predicting these figures discourages such research and development.
I 15. If substitution leads to an increased sales price, rather than to increased sales, royalties under a total-sales royalty provision will also increase if the total-sales royalty is based on
a "percentage" of total dollar sales. See note 7 supra for a discussion of "percentage" and
"flat-rate" total-sales royalties. Thus, the only situation in which royalties under a total-sales
provision will not increase is when the royalty is based solely on the amount of sales (a "ftatrate" provision) and the substitution leads to an increased sales price.
I 16. A substitute patent may improve the end product and enable the licensee to increase
its sales or its sales price. To the extent this occurs, the licensee's total revenue will of course
rise.
I 17. If the original patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty provision, the increase in
total revenue required to justify licensing a substitute patent can be determined as follows:
assume
P = net profits
S 1 = sales price per unit prior to substitution
S2 = sales price per unit after substitution
F = fixed costs
V = variable costs (including the total-sales royalty on the original
patent)

Q1

Q2

= quantity sold prior to substitution

= quantity sold after substitution
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such a revenue increase must be uninterested in purchasing a substiso that

P = (S • 0) - [F + (V • 0)]
Thus, if the licensee is to pay fixed royalties for the substitute patent (Rb), it would make
economic sense to license the substitute patent only when
(S2 • 02) - [(F +Rb)+ (V • 02)]

>
(S1 • 0 1) - [F + (V • 01)]
Similarly, if the licensee is to pay a royalty for the substitute patent of a variable amount per
unit sold (Rb), it would make economic sense to license the substitute patent only when
(S2 • 0 2) - [F + [Q2(V +Rb)]]
.

>
(S1 • 01) - [F + (V • 01)]
These two equations assume that the original patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty
provision. If, however, the royalty on the original patent is based solely on patent use, it is
more likely that the licensing of a substitute patent would make economic sense, since the
elimination of royalties on the original patent will reduce the product's variable costs by Ra
per unit. If, for example, the licensee is to pay fixed royalties for the substitute patent (Rb), it
would make economic sense to license the substitute patent when
(S2 • 02) - [(F + Rb) + [02(V - Ra)]]

>
(S1 • 01) - [F + (V • 01)]
Similarly, if the licensee is to pay a royalty of a variable amount per unit sold (Rb) for the
substitute patent, it would make economic sense to license the substitute patent when
(S2 • 0 z) - [F + [0 2(V + Rb - Ra)]]

>
(S1 • 0 1) - [F + (V • 01)]
These conclusions can be more clearly illustrated by the following examples. The examples will be based on these assumptions:
S1 = $10
01 = 10,000
S2 = $11
02 = 11,000
F = $10,000
Ra= $2
V = $8
(I) Suppose the licensee is to pay a fixed royalty of $20,000 for the substitute patent (Rb
= $20,000). If the originar patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty, then
($11 X 11,000) - [($10,000 + $20,000) +($8 X 11,000)]
= $121,000 - $118,000
= $3,000

<
($10

X

10,000) - [10,000 + {$8
$90,000

= $100,000 = $10,000.

X

10,000)]

In other words, under the above facts, it would not make economic sense for the licensee to
license a substitute patent even though the substitute patent would lead to increased sales of
1000 units at a selling price 10 per cent higher. (For purposes of simplicity, this example
assumes the original patent is licensed under a "flat-rate" total-sales royalty provision. See
note 7 supra. If a "percentage" total-sales royalty provision had been employed, then the
royalty per unit sold (Ra) after the substitution would be equal to the applicable percentage
rate multiplied by the sales price per unit after the substitution.)
Conversely, if the royalty on the original patent is based solely on patent use, it would
make economic sense, under the above facts, for the licensee to license a substitute patent.
This is because
·
($11 X 11,000) - [($10,000 + $20,000) + [11,000 ($8 - $2)])
= $121,000 - ($30,000 + $66,000)
= $25,000

>
$10,000.
(2) Now suppose the licensee is to pay a royalty of a variable amount of $2 per unit sold
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tute patent, and the market for new inventions will be reduced. 118
Conversely, if the royalty on the original patent is based solely on
patent use, licensees would more often find it profitable to solicit and
license a substitute patent, since substitution would relieve the licensee of the obligation to pay royalties on those end products which
did not use the original patent. The variable cost of each end product, in other words, would be reduced. Licensees would find substitution profitable either where the substitute patent license called for
lower total royalty payments or where the substitution resulted in
product improvements which increased total revenues. 119
Total-sales royalty provisions, then, discourage invention and
thus undermine the patent policy. Moreover, the Zenith conditioning test does not prevent that consequence. Even a convenient or
freely bargained for total-sales royalty provision limits the market
for new inventions in the product lines subject to the royalty.
The conditioning test might be justifiable if it measured whether
the licensee planned to "invent around" the patent or to license substitute patents. If the parties had freely bargained for the total-sales
royalty, a court might infer that the licensee did not contemplate "inventing around" the patent or licensing substitute patents and that
therefore the total-sales royalty agreement would not affect the patfor the substitute patent (Rb = $2). If the original patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty
provision, the licensee would not license a substitute patent. This is because
($11 X 11,000) - [$10,000
$120,000
$1,000

= $121,000 -

=

+ (11,000 ($8 + $2)1]

<
$10,000.

If, on the other hand, the royalty on the original patent is based solely on patent use, the
licensee would license the substitute patent. This is because
($11 X ll,000) - r$10,000 + (11,000 ($8
($10,000 + $88,000)
$23,000

= $121,000 =

+ $2 -

$2)]]

>
$10,000.

This Note has discussed the amount by which total revenue must increase to justify the
licensing of a substitute patent. Although the amount by which costs must be reduced to justify substitution could be similarly estimated, this Note does not undertake to do so.
118. New producers, of course, may enter the market. To the extent they purchase new
patents, market foreclosure may not be significant. Nevertheless, the removal of only a few
potential patent purchasers from the market may significantly reduce the opportunities of inventors. From the perspective of the inventor, that reduction is particularly acute in those
product lines where a certain patent is almost a prerequisite to the manufacture and sale of the
end product. If the patentee of such a patent has licensed most of the manufacturers of the
product under a total-sales royalty provision, the outside inventor who seeks to create a new
patent in the area would be almost completely foreclosed. The inventor would not be foreclosed, of course, if the substitute patent generated cost savings greater than the total-sales
royalty payments.
119. See note 117 supra.
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ent policy. However, since future inventions are typically unforeseeable, it cannot sensibly be inferred that a licensee knew in advance
whether it would be economically benefitted by seeking a substitute
patent. But even if the licensee fully calculated the risk of unforeseeable future inventions and concluded that a total-sales royalty was
advantageous, and even if the conditioning test reflected those calculations, the conditioning test remains unsatisfactory, since the goals
of the licensee are not those of the patent policy. The societal interest in inventive activity is harmed whenever a total-sales royalty discourages the licensee from "inventing around" the original patent or
soliciting a substitute patent. The conditioning test leaves untouched, for example, the prospective inventor's deprivation of the
market opportunities !esulting from the licensing of many producers
under a total-sales royalty provision. 120
2.

Economic Effects and Antitrust Policy

Automatic Radio, we have seen, held that total-sales royalty provisions create "no restraint of competition beyond the legitimate
grant of the patent." 121 Since Zenith did not overrule that holding
and did not discuss the anticompetitive effects inherent in the royalty
provision, the Zenith Court also must have concluded that-at least
where the provision was not forced upon the licensee-a total-sales
royalty provision lacks anticompetitive effects. Since restraint of
competition is a legitimate concern of the misuse doctrine, 122 a fuller
analysis of the anticompetitive eij'ects of total-sales royalties is warranted.
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Zenith, referred to and rejected
Professor Baxter's economic analysis of legal restrictions on the exploitation of the patent monopoly. 123 Baxter argued that all royalties
based on a percentage of a lice11see's sales of "unpatented end products" should be prohibited because they restrain output and increase
prices of the unpatented end products incommensurately with the
value of the invention. 124 By ''unp~tented end product" Baxter
120. See note 118 supra.
121. 339 U.S. at 833.
122. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
123. 395 U.S. at 145. See Baxter, supra note 60.
124. See Baxter, supra note 60, at 356. Baxte.fs ;malysis is complex and difficult to follow.
The relevant part of his reasoning, however, can be explained as follows. As a general proposition a producer uses various proportions of goods and services, or inputs, in the production
of a given end product. This production "recipe'"is l]SUally flexible, so that the amount of each
input used to produce the end product can vary according to the cost of the input and its
marginal physical product. (Marginal physical product of an input is the change in output that
will result from an incremental change in the quantity of a single input, while other inputs are
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meant a product sold by the licensee which uses a licensed patent but
which is not as a whole patented. 125 The licensed patent is merely
part of the recipe for the end product.
Baxter condemned all percentage-of-sale royalties and did not
distinguish total-sales royalties from percentage-of-sale royalties that
require a royalty only on those end products which employ the licensed patent. Since the practice of calculating royalties upon the
sale of end products has long been accepted by business and by the
courts, 126 it is not surprising that Justice Harlan rejected Baxter's
analysis and declined to condemn all percentage-of-sales royalties.
What both Justice Harlan and Professor Baxter missed, however, is
that total-sales royalties-as distinguished from other royalties based
on end product sales-have particularly undesirable anticompetitive
effects and can be independently condemned. 127 Specifically, a totalsales royalty, unlike a percentage-of-sales royalty based solely on
patent use, may prevent the licensee from entering new markets. 128
held constant.) If a patented input, say factor A, has no use other than as an input of unpatented end product X, there are several ways the licensor-monopolist of A can garner larger
monopoly profits. One of these is to use a royalty based on a percentage of licensee sales of the
unpatented end product X. Under such a royalty the licensee will pay nothing for the incremental use of the invention A in the production of any given output. This discourages the
substitution of other inputs for the licensed input A. The licensee cannot substitute against his
own output other than by restricting it and raising his prices just as a monopolist would. Baxter concluded that this monopolization of X will lead to the underutilization of all inputs even
if the production recipe is efficient. Given the trade-off between greater X output and an
efficient production recipe, Baxter argued that the social gain attributable to greater X production outweighed the disutility elsewhere in the economy imposed by incremental consumption
of other inputs.
125. This Note uses "end product" to mean a product unit that may or may not embody a
patent. See note 6 supra. Baxter's use of the term differs in that he refers to a product unit
which is not patented but does embody a patent.
126. See Oppenheim & Scott, 14 IDEA 193, supra note 6. Indeed, Baxter himself recognized that most royalties are based on a percentage of the licensee's sales. Baxter, supra note
60, at 302.
127. The purpose of this Note is not to advocate a reform as far-reaching as that proposed
by Baxter, but to attempt to distinguish total-sales royalties from other royalties based upon
end product sales and to point out that the economic evils inherent in the total-sales royalty are
greater than those of the ordinary royalty based upon end product sales.
128. In deciding whether or not to make an investment, firms often use "break-even" analysis. See J. WESTEN & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 71-76 (6th ed. 1978). Break-even
analysis determines the point at which sales equal total costs. In other words, break-even
analysis is a technique for studying the relationship among fixed costs, variable costs, and
profits. If a firm's costs were all variable, the problem of break-even volume would seldom
arise; a firm with some variable and some fixed costs must suffer losses until a given volume
has been reached. The break-even point is described algebraically as follows:
If:

S
Q
F
V

=

sales price per unit

=

variable costs per unit

= quantity produced and sold
= fixed costs

Q=F+V•Q
S•Q-V•Q=F

Then: S •

Q (S-V)

=F

Q (at break-even point)= - 8 F

-v
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A total-sales royalty attaches a variable cost to end products even
though they do not use the patent. 129 This variable cost cannot be
avoided by substituting a new patent: so long as the licensee continues to sell the product covered by the royalty, the licensee must pay
royalties even though the end product makes no use of the patent. 130
These facts may discourage the licensee from entering other market
segments 131 for the product covered by the royalty. Suppose that a
lens manufacturer decides to sell hard contact lenses and desires to
license a hard-lens patent. Further suppose that the hard-lens patentee and the manufacturer agree to a total-sales royalty provision calling for a royalty on the sale of any contact lens. If opportunities
were to develop for expansion into the soft-lens market, the licensee
company would have to decide whether it would be profitable to expand into the market. This decision would be distorted by the initial
total-sales royalty provision: the added variable cost of the royalty
on the soft lens to the hard-lens patentee must reduce the profit margin obtainable from the sale of soft lenses and must thereby artificially deter the licensee from entering the new market segment. 132
Id. at 73. (The above discussion assumes linear (straight-line) relationships. It assumes, for
example, that variable costs and sales price do not change as units sold increase.)
129. The amount of this added variable cost will depend upon the type of total-sales royalty employed. The "percentage" royalty, for example, is calculated by applying a percentage
rate to the licensee's total dollar sales of a specified product, while the "flat-rate" royalty is
calculated by multiplying the number of units of the product sold by a specified flat-rate in
dollars. See note 7 supra.
The variable costs added by adoption of a flat-rate royalty provision equals the flat rate
paid on the sale of each unit sold. This type of royalty will affect the licensee's break-even
point as follows:
If:
Q = quantity of product covered by the total-sales royalty needed to be
sold to break even
F = fixed costs
S = sales price per unit
V = variable costs per unit (excluding royalties)
Rf = flat-rate royalty per unit
Then: Q -

F

S - (V

+ Rf)

Under a percentage total-sales royalty, the added variable cost will equal the percentage rate
times the sales price of one unit. This kind of royalty will affect the licensee's break-even point
as follows:
If:
Q = quantity of product covered by the total-sales royalty needed to be
sold to break even
F = fixed costs
S = sales price per unit
V = variable costs per unit (excluding royalties)
Rp = percentage total-sales royalty
Then: Q = s - [V :(Rp • S))
Under a percentage total-sales royalty, any price increase will also lead to increased royalties.
130. See text at note 112 supra.
131. See note 7 supra.
132. The effect of the total-sales royalty upon a decision to enter a new product market
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Where entry into the new market segment offers a relatively low
profit margin the added variable cost of each end product in the new
segment must often so reduce the licensee's profit margin that entry
is economically infeasible. 133 In short, the total-sales royalty will restrain competition in markets not dependent upon the teaching of
segment can be illustrated by the following example. First, note that, as is discussed in note
129 supra, the break-even points using a flat-rate (Rf) and percentage (Rp) total-sales royalty
are as follows:
Flat-rate:

Q -

F
S-(V+RI)

Percentage:

Q -

F
S-[V + (Rp • S)l

Then suppose that a company projects sales of the new product segment of 10,000 units
and assume that
F = $10,000
S = $5
V = $3
If, under a total-sales royalty provision the licensee is to pay a flat-rate royalty of$ I (Rf= I),
then
Q =

<~

0
55 :

I)

= 10,000 units

This means that at a projected sales level of 10,000 units the company will just break even.
Accordingly, the licensee will not enter the new market. Moreover, since some minimum rate
of return will probably be required by the company, it is unlikely that the licensee will enter
the market even if sales are projected slightly in excess of 10,000.
In contrast, if the licensee is obligated to pay royahies solely on products which use the
patent's teaching, then the licensee need not pay the royalty Rf and the break-even quantity
can be determined as follows:
Q

=

IO,OOO = 5 000 Units
$5-$3'

Thus, in the absence of a total-sales royalty provision the company need sell only 5,000 units
of the product in order to break even. If, as we have assumed, the profit margin on each unit
sold is $2, and if a total of 10,000 units are sold, the company's estimated net profits arising
from entry will be $10,000. Since this appears to be an excellent return, it is likely that the
licensee would enter the new product segment.
It should be noted that the same outcome would have been reached if the licensee paid a
percentage total-sales royalty of 20% (Rp = 20%). As is the case under a flat-rate royalty
provision, a projected sales level of 10,000 units will mean that the licensee will just break
even.
10,000
Q ~ $5 - ($3 + (.20 X $5)] = IO,OOO
The break-even point of a royalty based solely on patent use, of course, will remain at 5,000
units as described above.
133. This can be illustrated by the following example. First, suppose that a licensee licensed a patent for a royalty of$10 on each end product sold (R = $10). Further, assume that
the variable costs per unit equal $50 (V = $50) and that the sales price per unit equals $100 (S
= $100). Thus, the licensee has a very attractive profit margin of $40:
S - (V + R) = $100 - ($50 + $10) = $40
Now suppose an opportunity arises for"~~ licensee to enter a new segment of the product
market and assume that the licensee estimates that its variable costs per unit excluding royalties will be $80 (V = $80) and that the sales price per unit will be $100 (S = $100). Since the
licensee is bound by the earlier total-sales royalty provision, the licensee must pay royalties of
$10 per end product sold even if the new end product makes no use of the patent. This means
that the licensee's profit margin on sales of the new product will be only $10:
S - (V + R) =_$100 - ($80 + $10) = $10
Depending upon the fixed costs involved in ~ntering the new segment and depending on the

.....
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the patent. In contrast, had the licensee only been paying royalties
on the use of the hard-lens patent, its decision would not have been
distorted by the license and it would have been far likelier to enter
the new market. 134
The anticompetitive effects of a total-sales royalty are especially
apparent where the patentee-licensor is competing with the licensee
in the sale of the product covered by the total-sales royalty, since the
patentee may employ a total-sales royalty provision to prevent the
licensee from entering potential market segments. Although a licensee could delay entry into the new market until the license term expired, the delay might so firmly entrench the patentee in that market
that it would be futile for the licensee, belatedly, to enter.
Finally, the Zenith conditioning test cannot prevent these anticompetitive effects. The licensee, unable to foresee future inventions or anticipate which markets it may wish to enter, may consider
a total-sales royalty provision an attractive proposal. A total-sales
royalty which was freely bargained for and unprotested by the licensee may still ultimately restrain competition. 135
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that the Supreme Court has not understood
the economic evils associated with total-sales royalty provisions. In
Automatic Radio, the Court condemned tie-in practices because they
projected sales of the product, this profit margin may or may not be sufficient to justify entry
into the new segment.
In contrast, if the original patent had been licensed with royalties payable only upon use of
the patent's teaching, then the profit margin on the new segment would be
S - V = $100 - $ 80 = $20
Accordingly, the licensee would be far more likely to enter the new market.
Finally, to the extent entry into the new segment requires the licensee to license additional
patents and pay additional royalties, the likelihood that entry will be profitable is further reduced.
134. See note 132 supra.
135. See also Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 299 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
o/(d., 420 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970), where the court, prior to the
Zenith decision, recognized that a total-sales royalty provision could reduce competition. The
court stated: "This royalty structure has the effect of raising the cost of non-patented, competing toilet tank covers, thereby restraining their output and tending to lessen competition in the
toilet tank cover industry." 299 F. Supp. at 282. The case was appealed. Subsequent holdings
are discussed at notes 95-99 supra. On remand, the district court held that the license agreements unreasonably lessened competition in the toilet tank cover industry. 324 F. Supp. I 133,
I 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Since the purpose of the patent laws is not "the creation of private fortunes," see note 20
supra, total-sales royalties are subject to a further objection. Even if the variable costs attached to any new or improved products covered by the royalty are not great enough to discourage. entry into a new market, the patentee will garner profits that are not properly
attributable to its inventive efforts. This will certainly be true whether or not the provision is
insisted upon by the patentee.
·
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restrain competition in unpatented goods, but it failed to recognize
that total-sales royalties also have anticompetitive effects. A licensee's inability under a total-sales royalty provision to avoid royalty
costs by substituting a new patent discourages invention. Furthermore, the licensee's inability to escape royalty costs when entering a
new market segment discourages licensees from entering new markets.
Zenith does not resolve these difficulties. It suggests but does not
demonstrate that the undesirable effects of total-sales royalties are
avoided if the royalty is not a product of conditioning. This Note
has argued that the fact that the provision is mutually convenient or
freely bargained for does not vitiate the economic evils inherent in
total-sales royalties.
The courts, then, should condemn all total-sales royalties as patent misuse. This rule would eliminate the uncertainties caused by
the conditioning test and would further the policies of both the patent grant and the antitrust laws.

